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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter is before this court on an appeal from an 
order denying defendant ARCO Chemical Company's 
("ARCO") motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the 
alternative, for a new trial, or in the alternative, for a 
remittitur, entered on June 30, 1998, in this employment 
discrimination case following a jury verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff, William P. Becker ("Becker"). See Becker v. ARCO 
Chem. Co., 15 F. Supp.2d 600, 621 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Becker 
I"). Becker cross-appeals from the district court's order of 
July 23, 1998,1 which granted in part and denied in part 
his motion to "mold" the verdict to include post-trial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. On August 31, 1998, the district court entered an order denying 
Becker's motion for reconsideration of its July 23, 1998 order. While 
Becker's notice of appeal recites that it is from the orders of July 23, 
1998, and August 31, 1998, effectively the cross-appeal is from the July 
23, 1998 order on the fee petition and motion to"mold" the verdict. 
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interest on the front pay award and pre-trial interest on the 
back pay award, and to reflect adverse tax consequences 
Becker suffered by virtue of the lump sum damages award 
on his age discrimination claims. See Becker v. ARCO 
Chem. Co., 15 F. Supp.2d 621, 639-40 (E.D. Pa. 1998) 
("Becker II"). Becker also cross-appeals from that aspect of 
the district court's July 23, 1998 order which granted in 
part and denied in part his petition for attorney's fees and 
costs. Id. 
 
Plaintiff sued ARCO under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 621 et seq., and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), Pa. Stat. 
Ann., tit. 43, SS 951 et seq. (West 1991), contending that 
ARCO discriminated against him on the basis of his age by 
terminating his employment with the company on March 4, 
1994. At the time of his discharge, Becker was 51 years 
old. After an 11-day trial which resulted in a verdict in 
Becker's favor, the district court on November 4, 1997, 
entered a judgment of $736,095.00 for Becker on the verdict.2 
 
While the appeal and cross-appeal raise several 
allegations of error, we only need address one issue-- 
whether ARCO is entitled to a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 59(a) based on the district court's admission, over 
ARCO's repeated objections, of Becker's testimony 
pertaining to the "manner" in which ARCO allegedly earlier 
had terminated another employee, Linwood Seaver. For 
convenience, we refer to Becker's testimony in this regard 
as "the Seaver evidence." ARCO contends that the 
admission of this evidence violated Fed. R. Evid. 
(hereinafter cited in the text as "Rule") 404(b), 403, and 
608(b), and that the district court's error in admitting the 
testimony was not harmless. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the district 
court erred by admitting the Seaver evidence pursuant to 
Rule 404(b). We also conclude that Rule 608(b) clearly does 
not provide a basis for introducing Becker's testimony on 
this point. Moreover, based on the record presented, we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The total judgment represented the following amounts: (1) 
$186,095.00 in back pay; (2) $380,000.00 in front pay; and (3) 
$170,000.00 in compensatory damages. 
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cannot say that it is highly probable that the district court's 
admission of this evidence did not affect ARCO's 
substantial rights. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 
779 F.2d 916, 924, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1985). Hence, the 
district court's erroneous evidentiary ruling requires us to 
reverse its order of June 30, 1998, insofar as it denied 
ARCO's motion for a new trial, and remand the matter to 
the district court with directions to grant a new trial on the 
age discrimination claims as to all issues. See id. at 931. 
Because we are remanding the matter for a new trial in its 
entirety, we will dismiss Becker's cross-appeal as moot, and 
we will not address ARCO's additional arguments presented 
in its appeal.3 See J&R Ice Cream Corp. v. California 
Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F.3d 1259, 1266 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
II. JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
over Becker's ADEA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331, 
and had supplemental jurisdiction over the PHRA claim 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367. We exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. At the outset, we note that ARCO has not challenged that aspect of 
the district court's opinion and order denying its motion for judgment as 
a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) based on the sufficiency 
of Becker's evidence of age discrimination. See Becker I, 15 F. Supp.2d 
at 606-09. Therefore, we will not consider whether ARCO is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on that basis. We also note that we have 
considered whether we could grant a partial new trial limited to the issue 
of ARCO's liability for age discrimination, but it is apparent to us that 
the issues of liability and damages are so intertwined that a new trial in 
its entirety is warranted in the circumstances. See Vizzini v. Ford Motor 
Co., 569 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1977) (discussing circumstances in 
which court may grant partial new trial) (quoting Gasoline Prods. Co. v. 
Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500, 51 S.Ct. 513, 515 (1931)); 11 
Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, S 2814, at 
150 (2d ed. 1995) ("It therefore now may be regarded as settled that if an 
error at trial requires a new trial on one issue, but this issue is 
separate 
from the other issues in the case and the error did not affect the 
determination of the other issues, the scope of the new trial may be 
limited to the single issue."). 
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In Bhaya v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 922 F.2d 184 
(3d Cir. 1990), we explained that when reviewing the 
district court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new 
trial, we must give substantial deference to the trial judge's 
decision " `who saw and heard the witnesses and has the 
feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can 
impart.' " Id. at 187 (quoting Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & 
Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216, 67 S.Ct. 752, 755 (1947)). 
We also stated that "[p]articular deference" is appropriate 
where the decision to grant or deny a new trial rested on 
the district court's evidentiary ruling that itself was 
entrusted to the trial court's discretion. See id.; see also 
Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921-22 
(3d Cir. 1986) ("Where a contention for a new trial is based 
on the admissibility of evidence, the trial court has great 
discretion . . . which will not be disturbed on appeal absent 
a finding of abuse.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
We have indicated that a finding of reversible error " `may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected.' " See Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 
191 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Linkstrom v. Golden T. Farms, 
883 F.2d 269, 269 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 
103(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. "In reviewing evidentiary rulings, 
if we find nonconstitutional error in a civil suit, such error 
is harmless only `if it is highly probable that the error did 
not affect the outcome of the case.' " Glass, 34 F.3d at 191 
(quoting Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. , 879 F.2d 
43, 53, 59 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
 
We review the district court's decision to admit evidence 
of a party's "prior bad acts" (which we will call "Rule 404(b) 
evidence") under Rules 404(b) and 403 for an abuse of 
discretion. See United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 133 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1999); J&R Ice Cream, 31 F.3d at 1268; see 
also Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 110 
(3d Cir. 1999) ("We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of 
discretion . . . with substantial deference under Rule 403.") 
(citation omitted); United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 437 
(3d Cir. 1996) ("Trial court rulings under Rule 404(b) are 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion and may be reversed 
only when they are `clearly contrary to reason and not 
 
                                5 
 
 
justified by the evidence.' ") (quoting United States v. 
Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1079 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation 
omitted)). Where, however, the district court fails to explain 
its grounds for denying a Rule 403 objection and its 
reasons for doing so are not otherwise apparent from the 
record, there is no way to review its discretion. See United 
States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 781 (3d Cir. 1994). In 
those circumstances, we need not defer to the district 
court's ruling, and we may undertake to examine the record 
and perform the required balancing ourselves. See id.; see 
also United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 n.9 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
III. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS 
 
A. Statement of Facts 
 
We recite the germane facts from Becker's perspective as 
the verdict winner. See J&R Ice Cream, 31 F.3d at 1262. 
ARCO's predecessor, Sinclair-Koppers Company, hired 
Becker as a chemist in its Product Development 
Department in 1970. In 1980, Becker transferred to ARCO's 
headquarters in Newtown Square, Pennsylvania, where the 
company assigned him to work in the physical testing 
laboratory until his discharge in March 1994. The physical 
testing laboratory is a part of ARCO's Chemical Research 
Services Group, which in turn is part of ARCO's Research 
and Development Department ("RDD"). At the time of 
Becker's discharge in 1994, Andrew Goldsmith 
("Goldsmith") was Manager of the Research Services Group, 
and James Victor ("Victor") was the Manager of the 
Chemical Analysis and Physical Testing Laboratories. Victor 
was Becker's immediate supervisor, and Goldsmith was 
Victor's immediate supervisor and Becker's "second-level 
supervisor." Goldsmith's predecessor in his position was 
Dr. Kermit Ramey ("Ramey"), who retired from ARCO in 
1992. 
 
The physical testing laboratory conducted routine 
strength and durability tests on various materials used in 
a variety of products. ARCO employed Becker as a"Senior 
Principal Scientist," and in that capacity, he supervised 
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three professionals, ten laboratory technicians and was 
responsible for testing thousands of samples. As the 
laboratory supervisor, Becker's responsibilities also 
included providing test results to ARCO's in-house 
 
customers that had submitted the samples for testing. 
Becker's position additionally required him to submit 
reports to his superiors which detailed his laboratory 
activities during specific time periods. App. at 2849.4 
 
In each year of his employment with ARCO, Becker 
received written performance evaluations, which he 
submitted for the jury's consideration. In each performance 
evaluation Becker's overall ratings from 1970 to 1993 were 
average, above average, and in some years, superior. 
Moreover, each year from 1970 to 1993, ARCO increased 
Becker's salary either by a merit increase or a bonus. Even 
in his last year of employment, ARCO awarded Becker a 
one percent bonus. 
 
Becker testified at trial that in May 1985, Kermit Ramey, 
then the Manager of the Research Services Group, told him 
that he was going to have a new supervisor, James Victor. 
According to Becker, Ramey told him that Dr. James 
Connor ("Connor"), Vice President of the RDD,"want[ed] to 
have younger people in management, [and] therefore, Jim 
Victor is going to be your new boss." App. at 2835. 
 
Becker also testified that in March 1987, Victor advised 
him during a telephone conversation about Becker's 1986 
performance review that "he [had] to knock[him] down a 
notch." App. at 2838. According to Becker, Victor stated 
that he was taking Becker "off the fast track," because 
"younger people are complaining because you older guys 
are getting all the money allocated for the merit budget." 
App. at 2839. Becker testified at trial that he was left with 
the impression after his conversation with Victor that he 
(Becker) was one of those "old guys," and that he was "in a 
pretty bad spot" at that point. Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Throughout this opinion, we cite the Joint Appendix as "App. at ___." 
Similarly we refer to the trial exhibits, which are bound and paginated 
separately, as "TE at ___." Also, we refer to the parties' briefs in the 
appeal from ARCO's post-trial motion as "Appellant ARCO's Br. at ___" 
and "Appellee Becker's Br. at ___." 
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Becker testified that in August 1990, he met with Ramey 
and Victor and discussed Linwood Seaver's work 
performance. According to Becker, Ramey asked Becker to 
confirm his (Ramey's) understanding concerning certain 
aspects of Seaver's work on the "Fibersorb project," a 
project that Becker had supervised. Becker testified at trial 
that Ramey asked him if he recalled that the project was a 
"disaster," with bad data and poor test results. Becker 
further testified that he told Ramey that he could not 
confirm Ramey's impression in that regard because it was 
completely contrary to his (Becker's) recollection of the 
results achieved on the project. Becker testified that Ramey 
said in response that "it doesn't make any difference 
anyhow, Seaver isn't coming back here regardless. He's 
fired and that's that." App. at 3232-33. 
 
The record also reflects that in late 1991, ARCO offered 
certain employees an early retirement package. ARCO 
approached Becker with the offer, but he rejected it 
because he wanted to continue working for the company. 
App. at 2840; app. at 3255. Becker discussed the 
retirement package with Victor, and specifically addressed 
the reasons why he could not accept the offer. Becker 
explained that he "loved his job," "could not afford to 
retire," and that he planned on remaining at ARCO"for the 
duration." App. at 2842. According to Becker, Victor was 
"upset" at Becker's comments concerning his hopes of 
continued employment at ARCO, see id., and was "aloof 
and standoffish" towards him after that conversation. App. 
at 2843. 
 
Testimony adduced at trial shows that in Becker's 1991 
performance evaluation (completed in February 1992), 
Victor criticized Becker's handling of certain aspects of "the 
dylark test" that Becker performed during October 1991. 
App. at 2850-52. Becker described dylark as a "plastic 
material that can be molded into different shapes." Becker's 
principal responsibility in conducting the dylark test was to 
test the product's strength so that the material could be 
compared meaningfully to a competitor's similar plastic 
material. App. at 2843. Becker testified that he completed 
the tests in what he considered to be a timely manner, and 
reported their results to the customer. Nevertheless, Victor 
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criticized Becker's performance of the dylark test, stating 
that Becker's "personal credibility was damaged" because 
he failed to provide test data as promised and failed to 
communicate fully the details of the testing to the 
customer. TE at 154. 
 
After Victor refused to retract his negative comments in 
Becker's 1991 evaluation, Becker filed an Employee 
Problem Resolution ("EPR") appeal. ARCO designed the EPR 
process to assist employees with resolving employment 
performance issues without fear of reprisal. Apparently, 
ARCO did not resolve Becker's EPR appeal concerning his 
1991 evaluation to his satisfaction. App. at 2856. 
 
According to Becker, in July 1992, he found a note on 
his desk in the morning when he came to work. The note 
said "Congradulations [sic], short timer. ha ha." TE at 502. 
He took the note as meaning that he would not be 
employed at ARCO much longer. Becker did not know who 
put the note on his desk, but he had it notarized to prove 
that he received it that day. 
 
In June 1993, Dr. Kenneth McDaniel ("McDaniel") and 
Dr. Andrew Thompson ("Thompson"), two of Becker's ARCO 
customers, expressed dissatisfaction with the timeliness of 
certain foam samples submitted to Becker's laboratory. 
App. at 3095-96. Apparently, McDaniel and Thompsonfirst 
mentioned the perceived problems to their supervisor, Dr. 
John Televantos ("Televantos"). App. at 3112. Televantos, in 
turn, orally communicated these complaints and his own 
dissatisfaction with the physical testing laboratory to 
Becker's second-level supervisor, Goldsmith. App. at 3095- 
98. Later, both McDaniel and Thompson wrote memoranda 
which memorialized their complaints and the basis for 
them. TE at 35-36. Specifically, both McDaniel and 
Thompson complained that the slow turnaround time in 
Becker's laboratory caused them to transfer the necessary 
testing work to ARCO's South Charleston, West Virginia, 
facility. 
 
Sometime shortly after Goldsmith and Victor learned of 
the customers' complaints about Becker's laboratory, they 
consulted the Director of the Employee Assistance Program, 
David Sullivan, Ed. D. ("Sullivan"), and the Human 
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Resources Director, Ronald Shearer ("Shearer"), about the 
situation. Subsequently, Goldsmith and Victor told Becker 
that he was required to meet with Sullivan to discuss the 
basis for his performance problems. TE at 39. It appears 
from the record that McDaniel and Thompson wrote their 
memoranda to document their complaints around the same 
time frame that Goldsmith and Victor referred Becker for 
the evaluation. App. at 3132. Becker's supervisors, 
however, did not provide him with copies of the written 
complaints prior to his first meeting with Sullivan. App. at 
1115. 
 
Becker met with Sullivan twice in July 1993. Sullivan's 
notes indicate that he believed that Becker was under 
stress related to work and the alleged customer complaints, 
but that he "exhibited no signs of dysfunction," and thus 
was "capable of carrying out his duties." TE at 525. In view 
of the customer complaints and his supervisors' referral for 
the psychological evaluation, Becker feared at this point 
that his position was in jeopardy. Becker clearly was 
distressed by the fact that his supervisors required him to 
consult with Sullivan. 
 
In response to the McDaniel and Thompson memoranda, 
Becker submitted written "rebuttals" directed to his 
customers and supervisors. In those memoranda, Becker 
explained his position and characterized the customers' 
data and ultimate conclusions concerning his work as 
inaccurate and without merit. TE at 42-47; see also TE at 
566-84. Becker wrote these rebuttals in January 1994, 
after he met with Sullivan. 
 
Early on March 4, 1994, Victor, Goldsmith and Shearer 
met with Becker and informed him that he was terminated 
effective immediately. App. at 2865. Insofar as we can 
ascertain, ARCO took this step without prior warning. As 
might be expected, Becker, who had been employed by 
ARCO and its predecessors for about 24 years, was 
shocked by this treatment. In a letter dated March 4, 1994, 
Shearer confirmed Becker's dismissal, and referred to 
unresolved "performance issues" as its basis. TE at 637. 
ARCO's brief explains that Goldsmith and Victor decided in 
early 1994 to fire Becker because of Becker's (1) repeated 
problems with his customers; (2) continual refusal to 
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respond "constructively" to customer complaints; and (3) 
"apparent obsession with creating and distributing 
confrontational and often insulting rebuttal memoranda." 
Appellant ARCO's Br. at 15. 
 
According to Becker's theory at the trial, his customers 
fabricated the alleged problems with his laboratory at his 
supervisors' direction. Thus, in Becker's view, the 
customers' complaints were "trumped up" so that ARCO 
could cite them as a legitimate basis for terminating his 
employment. See Appellee Becker's Br. at 10; app. at 3132; 
app. at 3274-76. Thus, the validity of the customer 
complaints which allegedly served as part of the 
justification for Becker's dismissal became a central issue 
in the case. 
 Robert Smith ("Smith"), a laboratory technician, replaced 
Becker almost immediately after Becker's termination. 
Smith was 43 years old at the time of his promotion to 
Becker's position. Becker had hired and trained Smith, and 
was primarily responsible for his performance reviews. 
Appellee Becker's Br. at 11; app. at 2876-77. According to 
Becker, Smith was a very accurate and good technician, 
but he lacked the level of Becker's technical expertise and 
knowledge. Moreover, Becker also had indicated in Smith's 
1993 evaluation that he needed to develop further his 
interpersonal skills. Id. at 2877. 
 
ARCO offered to make Becker a lump sum payment 
"equal to 24 weeks of [Becker's] base pay, minus applicable 
withholdings," contingent on his signing a separation 
agreement requiring him, inter alia, to waive any future age 
discrimination claim against ARCO. Thus, ARCO offered 
Becker one week's pay for every year he had worked for 
ARCO or its predecessor. ARCO also said that it would pay 
him "four weeks' pay" and pay him for 30 days of unused 
vacation time. These payments were not contingent on 
Becker signing the release. Becker refused to sign the 
waiver, and subsequently filed this suit. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Becker filed his complaint in the district court on 
November 15, 1995, alleging violations of the ADEA (count 
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1) and the PHRA (count 2), and asserting a state law claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress (count 3). The 
district court granted ARCO's motion for summary 
judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim by order entered July 1, 1997, but denied its motion 
as to the state and federal age discrimination claims. App. 
at 602-06. The remaining counts proceeded to a singular 
trial on liability and damages. On November 3, 1997, the 
jury found that ARCO violated the ADEA and the PHRA by 
terminating plaintiff 's employment, and awarded Becker 
$736,095.00 in damages. 
 
Subsequently, the parties filed post-trial motions, the 
dispositions of which are the basis for these appeals. First, 
ARCO filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), or in the alternative for a 
new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a), or in the 
alternative for a remittitur. The district court denied 
ARCO's motion in its entirety by memorandum opinion and 
order entered June 30, 1998. See Becker I, 15 F. Supp.2d 
at 600. Second, Becker petitioned the district court for an 
award of $562,421.25 in attorney's fees and $36,613.95 in 
costs, and filed a separate motion to "mold" the verdict to 
include post-trial interest on the front pay award and pre- 
trial interest on the back pay award, and to reflect adverse 
tax consequences he suffered by reason of receiving his 
back pay and front pay award in a lump sum. By 
memorandum opinion and order entered July 23, 1998, the 
district court granted in part and denied in part Becker's 
petition for attorney's fees and costs, and his motion to 
mold the verdict. See Becker II, 15 F. Supp.2d at 621. Then 
on August 31, 1998, the district court entered an order 
denying plaintiff 's motion for reconsideration of the prior 
July 23, 1998 order in Becker II. 
 
ARCO appeals from the district court's order in Becker I, 
and Becker cross-appeals from the district court's order in 
Becker II and its order denying reconsideration. Becker 
does not appeal from the summary judgment on the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
ARCO contends that it is entitled to a new trial on the 
federal and state age discrimination claims based in part on 
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the district court's erroneous admission of certain evidence 
pertaining to the circumstances surrounding ARCO's 
discharge of Becker's co-employee, Linwood Seaver. ARCO 
contends that the court should have excluded the evidence 
pursuant to Rules 404(b), 403 and 608(b). Principally, it 
claims that there was not a proper basis under Rule 404(b) 
for admitting the "manner" in which ARCO terminated 
Seaver. Alternatively, it argues that assuming arguendo 
that Rule 404(b) permitted the evidence's admission, the 
district court should have excluded it under a balancing 
analysis pursuant to Rule 403. 
 
As previously mentioned, the district court permitted 
Becker to testify that, in August 1990, in connection with 
ARCO's dismissal of Seaver, Ramey asked Becker to 
confirm Ramey's understanding regarding the outcome of 
the "Fibersorb project," a project on which Seaver had 
worked and Becker had supervised personally. Specifically, 
Ramey asked Becker to confirm Ramey's understanding 
that the project was unsuccessful, which in turn obviously 
reflected poorly on Seaver. Becker's testimony on this point, 
in its entirety, is as follows: 
 
       Q. Now, I have another question about--taking you 
       back in time, if I may, to the time period of 1990, 
       around the time period of 1990, did there come a 
       time when you had a meeting with Dr. Ramey and 
       Mr. Victor regarding another ARCO employee? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. And can you tell the jury and his Honor about that 
       briefly? 
 
       A. Yes, I was asked by Mr. Victor to come to Dr. 
       Ramey's office. It was in the early afternoon of 
       August the 15th. Mr. Victor was there with Dr. 
       Ramey. Dr. Ramey handed me a letter that Mr. 
       Seaver had written to Dr. Griffith, the vice 
       president of research and development. Dr. Ramey 
       said that he wanted me just to focus on the part of 
       the letter that had to do with Fibersorb and that 
       Dr. Ramey wanted--needed to respond back to Dr. 
       Griffith in regards to the Seaver letter. 
 
                                13 
 
 
        Dr. Ramey said that according to his recollection 
       of the first meeting, there was some--it [ i.e., the 
       project] was a total disaster with bad data 
       presented and poor test results. 
 
       Q. And did you respond to that? 
 
       A. Yes, I did. 
 
       Q. And what was your response? 
 
       A. Well, I was totally shocked because we had 
       presented extensive laboratory data which showed 
       that that was totally opposite of what Dr. Ramey 
       had told me--had said about the bad data 
       presented and poor test results. 
 
       Q. What was your impression at that time? 
 
       A. Well, he was asking me if I had--if my recollections 
       were the same as his. And of course, they weren't 
       and I told him so. 
 
       Q. And what did you tell him? 
 
       A. I explained to him the entire circumstances of the 
       meeting that Dr. Ramey was referring to and after 
       I finished, Dr. Ramey said that it doesn't make any 
       difference anyhow, Seaver isn't coming back here 
       regardless. He's fired and that's that. 
 
App. at 3232-33. As both parties recognize, the inference 
that Becker drew from this alleged conversation was that 
Ramey and Victor wanted Becker to corroborate that Seaver 
performed poorly on the Fibersorb project, and thus, in 
essence, asked Becker to "lie" about the quality of Seaver's 
work. See app. at 674 (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for a 
New Trial); see also app. at 3238. Indeed, both Becker's 
testimony and his counsel's closing argument conveyed the 
message to the jury that it was Becker's impression that 
Ramey and Victor solicited his assistance in fabricating 
evidence of Seaver's poor performance on the project to 
facilitate Seaver's termination.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. For example, during Becker's cross-examination, ARCO's counsel 
elicited Becker's interpretation of the significance of Ramey's comments 
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While the record on the point is somewhat confusing, we 
have studied it intensely and it appears to us that Becker's 
counsel first raised the specific subject of the"Seaver 
evidence" during Becker's testimony on redirect 
examination. When ARCO objected to this testimony, 
Becker's counsel argued that the evidence was admissible 
at that juncture to contradict ARCO's prior testimony to the 
effect that it retained older employees. App. at 2956 ("Your 
honor, they opened the door when they were proud to say 
these people stayed. . . . This goes to the credibility and the 
pretext issues that are paramount in this case."); app. at 
2954 (by the court: "[T]here are two questions [pertaining to 
admissibility]: number one, whether this can be done on 
redirect. And I find I have a problem with that. But even 
assuming that this is proper redirect, the question would 
be whether you can introduce evidence of prior bad acts by 
the decision maker as a way of impeaching the decision 
maker's [credibility]."). At that time, the court excluded the 
testimony, holding as follows: 
 
        THE COURT: I find that it is beyond the scop e of 
       redirect. I also find that even if it is within the scope of 
       redirect, under [the] 403 analysis, the evidence should 
       not be allowed into the case. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to him at the meeting on August 15, and what Ramey wanted Becker to 
do: 
 
       Q. And your observations today, were that you were asked to lie, 
       correct? 
 
       A. Say that again? 
 
       Q. Your observations today when you spoke earlier were that you 
       were asked to lie. It was your impression that you were asked to 
lie, 
       correct? 
 
       A. At that time? 
 
       Q. Yes. 
 
       A. That's my feelings [sic], yes. 
 
App. at 3238; see also app. at 3242-46; app. at 3268-69 (Becker's 
closing argument). 
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        On the one hand, . . . whatever probative value the 
       evidence may have is substantially outweighed by the 
       danger of unfair prejudice involving a different 
       situation with a different employee, and the danger of 
       confusion to the jury as to what the issues are in this 
       particular case. 
 
        So that evidence, I find will be excluded. 
 
App. at 2958. 
 
The next day, October 24, 1997, Becker filed a 
memorandum of law in support of his attempt to introduce 
the "manner" of Seaver's termination, arguing that it was 
relevant to establish ARCO's "intent" in terminating plaintiff 
and "plan" of fabricating reasons for terminating older 
employees under Rule 404(b). See app. at 607-11 
("Plaintiff 's Memorandum of Law in Support of Introducing 
the Manner of Terminating Older Employees."). We 
understand that this was the first point at which Becker 
offered the evidence under Rule 404(b). 
 
On October 25, 1997, ARCO filed its opposition to 
Becker's memorandum, contending that Becker was 
offering his testimony concerning the "manner" in which 
ARCO allegedly terminated Seaver for an improper purpose 
under Rule 404(b). Specifically, it argued that Becker 
sought to establish from this evidence that, "because 
[ARCO] found it necessary to discharge another employee 
who was over 40, it must have been because of age 
discrimination, and therefore, because [ARCO] found it 
necessary to discharge plaintiff, it must also be because of 
age discrimination." App. at 615. 
 
In response to Becker's memorandum, the court heard 
oral argument on October 27, 1997, and appears to have 
retreated from its prior position regarding the testimony's 
admissibility. Because it is crucial to our analysis to 
understand the district court's rationale for admitting this 
evidence, we will highlight the relevant portions of the 
discussion between the court and counsel on this point: 
 
        THE COURT: [O]kay, it doesn't strike me that it [the 
       Seaver evidence] has anything to do with the reasons 
       why--why Mr. Seaver was terminated[.] [I]t has to do 
       with modus operandi of Mr. Victor and Dr. Ramey. 
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        . . . . 
 
        MS. MATOS [Becker's attorney]: It goes t o the state 
       of mind and the way that they-- 
 
        THE COURT: See, I think your motion kind . . .  of 
       asks for more than you need. I mean this doesn't seem 
       to me [to have] anything to do [with] the reason why 
       Seaver was terminated. That is not at issue. 
 
        The question is how--the point would be that if the 
       jury believed the testimony, it would show that Mr. 
       Victor and Dr. Ramey had previously created a pretext 
       to get rid of an employee. 
 
        Now that doesn't mean that they didn't have cause to 
       get rid of the employee, or that it was right or wrong. 
       It wouldn't get us down that road. So, that's what I--I 
       find your motion nothing out of the ordinary. 
 
        Lets hear from the defendant, what's the problem 
       with this. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        MR. JOHNS [ARCO's attorney]: [Y]ou 're going to ask 
       the question, plaintiff will get up and ask the question 
       and leave this inference out there. 
 
        THE COURT: Well, the inference, there is no 
       inference, I mean if you ask somebody to falsify 
       testimony, [t]hat's pretty clear. That has nothing to do 
       with it. That is--that would go to whether or not the 
       decision maker had previously created--it goes to 
       credibility, whether or not he had previously had 
       trumped up charges. I mean that's basically what it is. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        MR. JOHNS: Again, your Honor, the plaintiff is 
       confusing the decision maker in that case, which is 
       Kermit Ramey, with the decision makers in this case 
       which are Andrew Goldsmith and Jim Victor. And as 
       well, your honor, I believe that this is basically just a 
       spin on . . . what actually was testified to at Mr. 
       Becker's deposition. 
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        He testified at length about these circumstances and 
       never once said that anyone asked him to fabricate or 
       lie about this. 
 
        THE COURT: Well, I think that's proper cross- 
       examination, he may have a problem explaining that 
       . . . because that would seem to be pretty important. 
 
        MR. JOHNS: That's correct, your Honor, but I 
       thought your ruling now was that they could only ask 
       Mr. Victor and no[t] re-open-- 
 
        THE COURT: No, they will ask Mr. Victor. Mr. V ictor 
       may say yes, it all happened. If Mr. Victor denies it, 
       then in rebuttal then they can, they can put on a 
       witness that would address that issue. 
 
        MR. JOHNS: . . . . And plaintiff 's allegat ions relating 
       to Mr. Victor are solely that Mr. Victor may have been 
       present at this meeting. Even the plaintiff does not get 
       up and say that Mr. Victor asked him to fabricate 
       evidence. And Mr. Victor is the decisionmaker here, not 
       Dr. Ramey. And therefore, your Honor, we believe that 
       this is totally prejudicial at this late stage of the game. 
 
        THE COURT: Well, let's take it one step at a t ime. 
       We'll see what Mr. Victor says. 
 
App. at 3063-67. 
 
Quite predictably, Becker's counsel questioned Victor 
concerning the events that allegedly transpired, but he 
denied ever having been present in a meeting in which 
Ramey asked Becker to recollect Seaver's performance in a 
manner that was contrary to Becker's actual impressions. 
Subsequently, Becker's counsel outlined the substance of 
the proposed rebuttal testimony, and the court again 
addressed the admissibility of the Seaver evidence. At that 
juncture, the district court considered again whether 
Becker could testify, consistently with Rule 404(b), about 
his recollection of the meeting in which Seaver and the 
Fibersorb project were discussed. The colloquy during this 
later discussion reveals the district court's theory of 
admissibility under Rule 404(b) for this evidence: 
 
        THE COURT: . . . It's not being offered to say  that 
       Mr. Victor is a bad person because he had-he had done 
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       this in the past. It's being offered to show a pattern, or 
       habit. A pattern or habit can only be shown by 
       indicating what the person has done in the past. 
 
        Now, if they were going to show that he had--you 
       know, he was nasty to his neighbor, that's something 
       else. 
 
        MR. JOHNS: That's correct, your Honor, but one 
       instance in 1990 in which Mr. Victor sat in and 
       listened to Dr. Ramey does not establish a pattern or 
       habit. And under the rule, I think clearly the case law 
       is clear on that, that this should be excluded on that 
       basis. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        THE COURT: What you're saying is that you can' t 
       have a habit out of one act? 
 
        MR. JOHNS: That's right, your Honor. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        MS. MATOS: [in response] I don't think w e referred 
       to that rule, we referred to Rule 404(b). And actually 
       we are under Rule 404(b) . . . . 
 
        And under that rule, even in criminal cases, if a 
       criminal commits a crime in the past, even if he's not 
       convicted[,] that can be used. 
 
        THE COURT: Well, I mean it seems to me that in  this 
       case the event is nearly identical and as such it would 
       be probative of plan, knowledge, intent and preparation. 
 
        I would agree with you if it had to do with some other 
       conduct that is not probative, but we have allegedly the 
       same case. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        Now, I'm not telling you that its true. The jury may 
       not believe it at all, may think its ridiculous, but I can't 
       --I don't think there will be any stronger evidence. . . . 
       Now, that's entirely up to the folks in the jury to 
       believe it, but I think they ought to hear it. 
 
        . . . . 
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        [T]he point here is that you had an employee, and 
       the employee, there was a request, according to the 
       plaintiff, that he falsif[y] evidence. What difference does 
       it make if he's 80 years old, if he's 21 years old. The 
       point is that his testimony is that exactly what is 
       happening in this case, I was asked to do it before, that 
       goes to motive, intent and practice. . . . 
 
App. at 3225-30 (emphasis added). As these passages 
show, the court admitted the evidence under Rule 404(b), 
but did not perform a Rule 403 analysis on the record at 
that time.6 
 
The court, however, later did provide a limiting 
instruction to the jury in its charge, stating the purposes 
for which the Seaver evidence could be considered. But the 
court's jury instruction on this point was rather cursory, 
and we cannot understand how the jury could have derived 
much meaning from it: 
 
       Now you've also heard evidence of Mr.--Dr. Ramey 
       made comments to Mr. Becker in the presence of Mr. 
       Victor, concerning the termination of another ARCO 
       Chemical employee. Those statements were not 
       admitted into evidence to prove the character of Dr. 
       Ramey or Mr. Victor in order to show that they 
       performed similar acts when terminating Mr. Becker's 
       employment. You may only consider that evidence as 
       proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan or knowledge. 
 
App. at 3298 (emphasis added). 
 
We must determine whether the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting this evidence under Rule 404(b), 
and if not, whether the balancing test of Rule 403 
nonetheless compels the conclusion that the court erred in 
admitting the testimony. We begin with the concept of 
relevancy. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as"evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. While the district court did not make an analysis under Rule 403 at 
the time that it ruled that the Seaver evidence was admissible, it 
provided its rationale for admitting the evidence under Rule 403 in its 
memorandum opinion denying ARCO's post-trial motion. See Becker I, 
15 F. Supp.2d at 613-15. 
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is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is 
admissible unless the rules of evidence or other controlling 
constitutional provisions, statutes or rules provide 
otherwise. See Fed. R. Evid. 402; Sriyuth, 98 F.3d at 745. 
 
Rule 404(b) is one of the rules limiting the admissibility 
of otherwise relevant evidence. See Sriyuth, 98 F.3d at 745; 
see also United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (citing Huddleston v. United States , 485 U.S. 
681, 687, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1500 (1988)). In Sriyuth, we 
reiterated the long-standing principle that Rule 404(b) 
precludes the admission of evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts to prove a person's character. Sriyuth, 98 
F.3d at 745; see also United States v. Johnson , 199 F.3d 
123, 128 (3d Cir. 1999) (permitting admission of evidence of 
prior robbery to show defendant's "common plan" in 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. S 1951 for conspiracy to 
interfere with interstate commerce by robbery, and noting 
that we favor admission of Rule 404(b) evidence"if relevant 
for any other purpose than to show a mere propensity or 
disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the 
crime") (internal quotation marks omitted); Scarfo, 850 F.2d 
at 1019 ("We have said that we will refuse to admit 
evidence of prior criminal acts which has no purpose except 
to infer a propensity or disposition to commit crime.") 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 404(b) provides: 
 
       Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
       admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
       to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
       however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
       proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
       knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
       . . . 
 
We have adopted a four-prong test to determine the 
admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence: 
 
       `(1) the evidence must have a proper purpose under 
       Rule 404(b); (2) it must be relevant under Rule 402; (3) 
       its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect 
       under Rule 403; and (4) the [district] court must 
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       charge the jury to consider the evidence only for the 
       limited purpose for which it was admitted.' 
 
See J&R Ice Cream, 31 F.3d at 1268 (quoting United States 
v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 659 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting United 
States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992))); see 
also Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 781 (stating that for "other 
crimes" evidence to be admitted, it must be relevant 
logically, under Rules 404(b) and 402, to any issue other 
than the defendant's propensity to commit the act in issue, 
and its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect). 
 
In denying ARCO's motion for a new trial, the district 
court found Becker's testimony admissible under Rule 
404(b) because it was evidence of a "scheme or plan of 
fabricating reasons used by the decisionmaker in 
terminating employees." Becker I, 15 F. Supp.2d at 614. 
The district court also reasoned that "evidence of an 
instance in which a pretext was fabricated in connection 
with the termination of another employee, could also be 
relevant to the issue of whether Mr. Victor, the decision 
maker in this case, acted with discriminatory intent." Id. 
Reading these passages in conjunction with the court's 
statements on the record during the trial, we understand 
that the district court predicated its admissibility ruling on 
its conclusion that the Seaver evidence showed the plan, 
pattern or practice ARCO utilized in terminating its 
employees, which in turn was relevant to determining a 
specific disputed fact in the case--whether ARCO provided 
pretextual reasons to support Becker's dismissal. This 
specific disputed fact, in turn, was relevant to an ultimate 
fact in dispute--whether ARCO intentionally discriminated 
against Becker because of his age. Hence, the proffered 
purpose for introducing evidence tending to establish 
ARCO's plan in terminating employees was so that the jury 
could infer that ARCO had a discriminatory intent in 
discharging Becker from the way it allegedly terminated 
Seaver. On appeal, Becker repeats this theory of 
admissibility. See Appellee Becker's Br. at 40. 
 
ARCO contends that the district court's ruling in this 
regard is erroneous for two reasons. First, it asserts that 
the Seaver evidence could not be admitted to establish 
Victor's or Goldsmith's "scheme" or "plan" because neither 
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had asked Becker to recall any aspects of Seaver's 
performance on the Fibersorb project. As ARCO correctly 
points out, even according to Becker's version of the events 
that took place at the August 1990 meeting, Ramey--not 
Victor--asked Becker to substantiate Ramey's recollection 
concerning the disastrous results on the Fibersorb project. 
Appellant ARCO's Br. at 39. Second, ARCO contends that 
the event at issue, i.e., the meeting at which Ramey 
allegedly asked Becker to corroborate a fabricated 
performance deficiency, was too remote in time from 
Becker's eventual discharge to constitute evidence 
establishing ARCO's common scheme or plan. Thus, 
ARCO's contentions clearly implicate the first inquiry under 
the four-part analysis we described in J&R Ice Cream, 
namely, whether the testimony is admissible for a proper 
purpose under Rule 404(b). Given the two theories of 
admissibility proffered here, we must consider whether the 
Seaver evidence is admissible either to establish ARCO's 
intent or "scheme or plan."7 See Becker I, 15 F. Supp.2d at 
614. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We point out that Becker has not argued that the Seaver evidence was 
admissible for any other purpose other than establishing ARCO's intent 
and common scheme or plan, despite the fact that the district court, in 
a somewhat conclusory fashion, cited other purposes listed in Rule 
404(b) which it believed supported the admission of this evidence under 
the rule. For example, in its ruling on the record, the district court 
stated that, in addition to establishing ARCO's"intent" and/or "scheme 
or plan," the Seaver evidence was probative of, inter alia, ARCO's 
"knowledge," "motive" and "preparation." App. at 3228, 3230. Even if 
Becker had contended before us that these additional exceptions 
provided a legitimate basis for admitting the Seaver evidence under Rule 
404(b), we summarily would have rejected that argument. First, it cannot 
be argued plausibly that evidence of ARCO's alleged fabrication of 
Seaver's poor performance could establish ARCO's"preparation" or 
"motive" in connection with Becker's termination. Compare Balter, 91 
F.3d at 437 (holding that district court properly admitted Rule 404(b) 
evidence that defendant in murder-for-hire criminal trial boasted about 
his prior experience as a murderer for hire under the theory that it 
established the defendant's motive and preparation; the witness testified 
that the defendant stated that he "had done this type of thing before . . 
. 
 
that he had not been doing it, but would do it because he needed the 
money," and "that he knew what he had to do, he had done it before and 
he knew what he had to do to kill [the victim].") (internal quotation 
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First, we will consider Becker's contention that the 
Seaver evidence is admissible for purposes of establishing 
ARCO's intent to discriminate against Becker. While 
Becker's brief does not articulate clearly how this evidence 
tends to establish ARCO's intent to discriminate against 
Becker, it appears that Becker hoped, through this 
evidence, to demonstrate that ARCO terminated him in a 
similar manner, i.e., by fabricating performance problems 
to justify its predetermined decision to fire him. See 
Appellee Becker's Br. at 40. Becker contends, therefore, 
that the evidence was relevant logically to a disputed issue 
and admitted for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b)--to 
establish the discriminator's intent. In support of this 
argument, Becker asserts that similar evidence of past 
discriminatory treatment of other employees has been 
admitted in employment discrimination suits for that same 
purpose. 
 
To be sure, our precedents teach that in an employment 
discrimination case in which the employee's proof of 
intentional discrimination is comprised of circumstantial 
evidence, the trier of fact may infer an employer's 
discriminatory intent where the plaintiff 's evidence renders 
the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory reasons for the 
plaintiff 's discharge weak, implausible, inconsistent or 
contradictory. See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d 
Cir. 1994); see also Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and 
Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
Arguably, the Seaver evidence rendered ARCO's purported 
nondiscriminatory reasons weak or implausible, because it 
made it more likely that Becker performed satisfactorily and 
that ARCO fabricated reasons in order to facilitate his 
lawful termination. It is in this sense, then, that the Seaver 
evidence arguably is relevant logically to the issue of 
ARCO's discriminatory intent towards Becker. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
marks omitted); see also Sriyuth, 98 F.3d at 747. Moreover, we fail to see 
how this evidence could be admitted under the theory that it was 
relevant to show ARCO's knowledge in terminating Becker. Obviously, 
there was no issue in this case about ARCO's knowledge of the 
circumstances surrounding Becker's dismissal. Thus, we will confine our 
analysis in the text to the two primary theories proffered in support of 
admissibility--intent and scheme or plan. 
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Nevertheless, while Becker may have demonstrated that 
the evidence is relevant logically to the issue of ARCO's 
intent, the inquiry under Rule 404(b) requires a more 
searching analysis which also focuses on the chain of 
inferences supporting the proffered theory of logical 
 
relevance. In Morley, we recently reiterated the self-evident 
proposition that "a proponent's incantation of the proper 
uses of [Rule 404(b) evidence] . . . does not magically 
transform inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence." 
Morley, 199 F.3d at 133. Indeed, when a proponent of Rule 
404(b) evidence contends that it is both relevant and 
admissible for a proper purpose, "the proponent must 
clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of 
logical inferences, no link of which may be the inference 
that the defendant has the propensity to commit the crime 
charged." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 782 (citing United States v. Jemal, 
26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994)); Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("In order . . . to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), a court 
must be able to articulate a way in which the tendered 
evidence logically tends to establish or refute a material fact 
in issue, and that chain of logic must include no link 
involving an inference that a bad person is disposed to do 
bad acts."). 
 
The Seaver evidence fails this test because the logical 
connection between ARCO's alleged "fabrication" of 
performance problems in relation to Seaver's dismissal and 
its purported conduct in terminating Becker is the 
inference that ARCO was likely to have fabricated customer 
complaints and other performance problems in Becker's 
case merely because ARCO previously engaged in a similar 
impropriety in facilitating Seaver's dismissal. The problem 
is, as we recognized in Morley, "this is the very evil that 
Rule 404(b) seeks to prevent." See Morley, 199 F.3d at 134. 
Put another way, the evidence of ARCO's "manner" of 
terminating Seaver simply is not relevant on the issue of 
whether ARCO discriminated against Becker absent the 
inference that ARCO had a propensity to act in a certain 
way, and that in firing Becker, it acted in conformity with 
its prior conduct. Compare Pinney, 967 F.2d at 917 ("In this 
case . . . there is no chain of logical inferences between a 
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rape of Jamilla by [the defendant] and [the victim's 
credibility, which was the proffered purpose for admitting 
the evidence under Rule 404(b)], which does not involve an 
inference that if Pinney raped Jamilla he is likely to have 
raped [the victim] as well."); see also Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 
1993) (finding that evidence that defendant had sexual 
intercourse with ten year-old victim's sister who was 13 or 
14 years old at the time was inadmissible under Rule 
404(b); court held that the evidence "suggested to the jury 
that [defendant] had a propensity to engage in intercourse 
with minor females, and that he had a particular affinity for 
underage daughters of Ursula Williams"). Accordingly, 
because Becker has failed to articulate how the Seaver 
evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences pointing 
towards ARCO's intent without involving the inference that 
because ARCO committed the first act it was more likely to 
have committed the second, see Pinney, 967 F.2d at 916, 
we cannot agree with the district court's conclusion that 
the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) to establish 
ARCO's intent to discriminate against Becker. 
 
Our recent opinion in Morley supports our conclusion in 
this regard. See 199 F.3d at 129. There the government 
charged the defendant, Morley, with conspiracy, mail fraud, 
bank fraud and wire fraud in connection with his conduct 
in allegedly attesting to a signature on a forged will. The 
government's theory of the case was that Holmes, Morley's 
business associate, had an agreement with the decedent's 
two sons whereby he would draft a "fake will" that would 
make it seem that the decedent left the two sons with the 
entirety of his estate. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, 
however, Holmes and the two sons each would receive 1/3 
of the estate, and according to the government, Holmes was 
supposed to split his 1/3 share with Morley. Morley's role 
in offense was that he attested to the signature on the fake 
will. Morley's defense was that while he admitted that he 
attested to the will outside the testator's presence, he did 
not know that Holmes forged the testator's signature. See 
id. at 131-32. 
 
Over Morley's objection, the government introduced 
evidence which established that 14 months prior to his 
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arrest, he asked his parents to notarize 100 savings bonds 
purportedly signed by their rightful owner. As it turned out, 
Holmes apparently also had forged the signatures on the 
bonds. At trial, however, the government did not introduce 
any evidence to establish that Morley knew of the forgery. 
Nevertheless, Morley did not deny that he asked his parents 
to notarize the bonds, and it was undisputed that his 
parents eventually complied with his request. See id. at 
132. 
 
The government argued that this evidence was relevant to 
establish Morley's "knowledge, intent, plan, and modus 
operandi of falsely witnessing the will of a dead man who 
was neither known nor present." Id. After the jury convicted 
Morley on all counts, he appealed, contending that the 
district court erroneously admitted the evidence showing 
that he asked his parents to notarize the forged bonds. 
 
We vacated Morley's conviction and remanded for a new 
trial. In particular, we found that the evidence of his prior 
conduct in asking his parents to notarize the savings bonds 
was not admissible under Rule 404(b) to establish his 
knowledge and intent in attesting to a forged signature on 
the will. We explained our reasoning in part as follows: 
 
       [T]he government asserts that the challenged evidence 
       was relevant to Morley's knowledge and intent at the 
       time Holmes [the business associate] asked him to sign 
       the will as a `third witness.' . . . This refrain is repeated 
       throughout the government's brief. Yet, upon close 
       examination, the only connection between Morley's 
       request to his parents to notarize the bond, and his 
       alleged attestation on the forged will is the inference 
       that Morley was likely to have been guilty of the latter 
       merely because he had previously engaged in a `similar' 
       impropriety. This is the very evil that Rule 404(b) seeks 
       to prevent. Evidence pertaining to the notarized bonds 
       is simply not relevant to whether Morley knew the 
       signature on the [alleged testator's] will was forged 
       absent the natural (and improper) inference that lurks 
       beneath the surface of the government's use of this 
       evidence. At trial, the prosecution did not even attempt 
       to establish that Morley knew the signature on the 
       bonds was forged. 
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Id. at 133-34 (footnote omitted). We further clarified that 
last statement in a footnote: 
 
       We do not mean to suggest that the evidence would 
       necessarily have been proper if the government had 
       shown that Morley knew the signature on the bonds 
       was a forgery. We do, suggest, however, that the 
       government's failure to establish that guilty knowledge 
       further undermines the government's assertion that 
       the prior conduct was relevant to Morley's intent in 
       attesting to the forged signature on the fake will. 
 
Id. at 134 n.8. 
 
We determined that the chain of logical inferences the 
government offered in support of the admission of the Rule 
404(b) evidence in Morley was tainted by an impermissible 
inference concerning the defendant's character and his 
propensity to commit the charged crime. See id.  at 137. 
Indeed, it was obvious to us that the only reason that 
Morley's request to his parents to notarize the forged bonds 
was relevant to the issue of his intent and knowledge with 
respect to his attestation of the fake will was because that 
prior conduct was similar in nature to the charged offense 
and showed that he had certain "propensities," which in 
turn made it more likely that Morley knew the will was fake 
when he signed it. We observed that the best explanation of 
why the government offered the evidence was so that the 
jury could infer from it that Morley "was the kind of guy 
who had done it before, [and therefore was] the kind of guy 
who will do it again." Id. at 134. 
 
Here, too, the chain of logical inferences supporting the 
admission of the Seaver evidence to show ARCO's intent 
involves a link predicated on the suggestion that in 
terminating Becker, ARCO engaged in a "similar 
impropriety" as that which allegedly had occurred in 
connection with Seaver's dismissal. Specifically, the initial 
factual proposition, i.e., that ARCO fabricated Seaver's poor 
performance, and the ultimate conclusion, i.e. , that ARCO 
discriminated against Becker, are linked by the inference 
that if ARCO fabricated Seaver's poor performance on the 
Fibersorb project to facilitate his dismissal, it is more likely 
that ARCO fabricated the customer complaints about 
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Becker to achieve the same result. From that premise the 
jury could have inferred that ARCO intentionally 
discriminated against Becker, inasmuch as the Seaver 
evidence would have demonstrated that ARCO's proffered 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Becker's 
termination were weak, implausible and/or contradictory. 
See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. 
 
We point out in this regard that Becker's most 
comprehensive explanation of what he considered to be the 
logical relevance of the Seaver evidence to the issue of 
ARCO's intent occurred during the court's colloquy with 
counsel on this point, but that the counsel's proffered 
justification for admitting the evidence amounted to little 
more than a "mantra-like recitation of the provisions of 
Rule 404(b)." Morley, 199 F.3d at 137; see app. at 3227 
("[A]ctually we were under 404(b), `It may however be 
admissible for other purposes such as motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.' ") (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). 
Merely citing the relevant Rule of Evidence, however, is of 
little assistance to either the trial or appellate court in 
determining the difficult issue presented when confronted 
with a proffer of Rule 404(b) evidence, and it falls woefully 
short of the proponent's obligation when offering such 
evidence purportedly for a non-character purpose. See 
Morley, 199 F.3d at 137. 
 
We also find it significant that in this appeal Becker has 
failed to present an alternative chain of inferences by which 
the Seaver evidence logically could be connected to the 
issue of ARCO's intent, with no link predicated on an 
inference concerning ARCO's propensity to act in a certain 
way. Of course, this is not surprising given the record 
presented here and Becker's theory of the case. Compare 
United States v. Dise, 763 F.2d 586, 592-93 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(defendant's prior similar incidents of misconduct were 
relevant to establish his intent to injure inmates where 
defendant contended that he acted only to maintain safety 
or to prevent harm). Indeed, our review of the record 
confirms that Becker grounded his case against ARCO 
largely on his assertion that the customer complaints and 
alleged performance problems were pretextual. Yet only if 
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 the jury were to draw the inference that in terminating 
Becker, ARCO must have fabricated his alleged 
performance deficiencies, would the Seaver evidence have 
established circumstantially ARCO's intent to discriminate 
against Becker. As we observed in Morley, this sort of 
character-based inference "is the very evil that Rule 404(b) 
seeks to prevent." Morley, 199 F.3d at 134. Therefore, we 
hold that the district court erred in admitting the Seaver 
evidence based on its conclusion that it could be 
introduced for the non-character purpose of establishing 
ARCO's intent to discriminate against Becker.8 See Pinney, 
967 F.2d at 916. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We have not overlooked numerous cases which have held that, as a 
general rule, evidence of a defendant's prior discriminatory treatment of 
a plaintiff or other employees is relevant and admissible under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to establish whether a defendant's 
employment action against an employee was motivated by invidious 
discrimination. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n.2, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481 n.2 (1983) (stating 
that evidence of an employer's comments were admissible to prove race 
discrimination); Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 512-13 (6th Cir. 
1998) (noting that evidence of a racially hostile atmosphere was 
admissible in Title VII suit to illustrate decisionmaker's attitude); 
Heyne 
 
v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1995) (same, in sexual 
harassment suit under Title VII); Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 
F.2d 337, 349-50 (1st Cir. 1989) (permitting evidence of remarks made 
by president of the University concerning another woman on theory that 
the remarks could be construed as demonstrating sexist attitude); Estes 
v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1102-04 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that "circumstantial proof of discrimination typically includes 
unflattering testimony about the employer's history and work practices"); 
Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1423-24 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(upholding district court's admission of evidence of harassment of other 
workers to show that employer condoned racial harassment); see also 
Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1995) (age-related 
comments and evidence of how supervisor treated older employees was 
probative of whether supervisor harbored discriminatory attitude against 
older workers); Glass, 34 F.3d at 194-95 (evidence of prior racial 
harassment was relevant to whether plaintiff was terminated because of 
age and/or race discrimination). In those cases, the courts admitted the 
evidence because of the discriminatory nature of the prior conduct, 
which in turn tended to show the employer's state of mind or attitude 
towards members of the protected class. Thus, in those circumstances, 
the inference of the employer's discriminatory attitude came from the 
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Becker next contends that the Seaver evidence is 
admissible under the alternative theory that it 
circumstantially established ARCO's "plan," which is a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
nature of the prior acts themselves, and the prior acts of discrimination 
were not offered for the purpose of establishing the fact that the 
employer engaged in any particular act or course of conduct in 
connection with the plaintiff 's termination. Compare Heyne, 69 F.3d at 
1480 (in Title VII quid pro quo action where plaintiff claimed that her 
employer came to her mobile home after work and propositioned her for 
sex and employer denied propositioning plaintiff, court of appeals held 
that plaintiff was entitled to introduce evidence of employer's treatment 
of other female employees, as it was probative of whether he terminated 
her because she rebuked his advances; nevertheless it stated specifically 
that "[the employer's] alleged harassment of other female employees 
cannot be used to prove that [the employer] propositioned [plaintiff] on 
the night before she was fired.") (citing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). 
 
But it is clear from the limited nature of the Seaver evidence that the 
district court did not admit it based on the theory that it tended to 
establish, by its very nature, ARCO's discriminatory attitude towards its 
older employees. Compare Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1214-15. Rather, the 
district court admitted the testimony based on the theory that ARCO 
trumped up charges against any employee it wanted to discharge, not 
just the older ones, and the evidence was admitted for the specific 
purpose of establishing that ARCO fabricated performance problems in 
Becker's case. This distinction is confirmed by the fact that the jury did 
not hear any evidence pertaining to Seaver's age. The district court ruled 
that Becker could not testify on that point because it was hearsay and 
irrelevant, given the purpose for which the evidence was admitted. App. 
at 3230 (district court stating "[w]hat difference does it make if he's 
[Seaver] 80 years old, or if he's 21 years old? The point is that his 
testimony is that exactly what is happening in this case, I was asked to 
do it before, [and] that goes to motive, intent and practice."). 
 
Thus, the rather circumscribed nature of Becker's testimony 
concerning the "manner" in which ARCO terminated Seaver 
distinguishes this evidence from the type of Rule 404(b) evidence 
generally admitted in employment discrimination trials for the purpose of 
establishing the employer's overall discriminatory attitude towards 
members of a protected class. Here the Seaver evidence, standing alone, 
does not suggest that ARCO possessed a discriminatory attitude towards 
its older workforce, and thus it was probative of the issue of ARCO's 
intent to discriminate only if the jury were to conclude that in firing 
Becker, it acted in the same way that it did when it discharged Seaver. 
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specific non-character purpose listed in Rule 404(b). Becker 
argues that the district court properly admitted the 
evidence to establish, under Rule 404(b), ARCO's plan, 
scheme, "practice," "modus operandi" or "pattern" of 
fabricating reasons for terminating unwanted employees. 
See app. at 3230. 
 
This assertion does little to answer the question of 
whether the evidence is admissible pursuant to that 
exception, however, as we have recognized that where proof 
of "a plan or design is not an element of the offense[,] . . . 
evidence that shows a plan must be relevant to some 
ultimate issue in the case." See J&R Ice Cream, 31 F.3d at 
1269 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, in order 
to determine if the Seaver evidence properly was admitted 
to show ARCO's "scheme or plan," which the district court 
described alternatively as ARCO's "pattern,""practice," and 
"modus operandi," we must pinpoint the evidential fact that 
Becker sought to prove from his testimony in that regard. 
From that initial inquiry, we must determine if the 
evidence, in the form that it was admitted at trial, satisfied 
the criteria necessary for admitting Rule 404(b) evidence on 
the theory that it establishes circumstantially ARCO's plan 
or scheme. 
 
As to the initial question, i.e., the evidential fact that 
Becker sought to establish in admitting the testimony, 
Becker contends that the evidence was admitted to prove 
ARCO's intent. Given our discussion above, this argument 
obviously is unavailing. To reiterate, the Seaver evidence 
cannot be admitted based on the theory that it was relevant 
to prove the ultimate disputed issue in the case, given the 
circumstance that the evidence would establish ARCO's 
intent to discriminate against Becker only if the jury drew 
the inference that in terminating him, ARCO acted in 
conformity with its purported prior conduct in terminating 
Seaver. 
 
As we have indicated, notwithstanding Becker's contrary 
arguments, the Seaver evidence could be material only to 
establish circumstantially that ARCO fabricated the 
performance deficiencies and customer complaints that 
allegedly formed the basis for Becker's termination. The 
question, then, is whether and in what circumstances 
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evidence concerning a defendant's prior conduct is 
admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of the defendant's 
plan, where the evidence is admitted for the specific 
purpose of establishing that the defendant committed a 
subsequent act that is disputed in the case. 
 
Commentators indicate that evidence tending to establish 
a defendant's plan or scheme under Rule 404(b) may be 
admitted for the purpose of proving the defendant's 
commission of the subsequent act itself where that issue is 
disputed. See, e.g., 1 John William Strong, ed., McCormick 
on Evidence S 190, at 800-01 (4th ed. 1992) ("McCormick") 
("Each crime should be an integral part of an over-arching 
plan explicitly conceived and executed by the defendant or 
his confederates. This will be relevant as showing motive, 
and hence the doing of the criminal act, the identity of the 
actor, or his intention.") (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted); see also II Wigmore, Evidence  S 300, at 238 
(Chadbourne rev. 1979) (discussing distinction between 
proving intent through similarity of prior act and act in 
issue and proving the commission of the subsequent act 
itself by virtue of evidential theory that the two acts are 
part of a singular plan or design, and explaining that 
"[d]esign or plan, . . . is not a part of the issue, . . . but is 
the preceding mental condition which evidentially points 
forward to the doing of the act designed or planned.. . . In 
proving design, the act is still undetermined , and the proof 
is of a working plan, operating towards the future with 
such force as to render probable both the act and the 
accompanying state of mind.") (emphasis added); II 
Wigmore, supra S 304, at 249 ("When the very doing of the 
act charged is still to be proved, one of the evidential facts 
receivable is the person's design or plan to do it."). 
Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, we hold that the 
district court erred in admitting the Seaver evidence on its 
theory that it established circumstantially the existence of 
ARCO's plan or scheme in terminating its employees. 
 
In J&R Ice Cream we explained the general theory behind 
admitting proof of a defendant's prior act to establish his 
"plan," which in turn demonstrates the defendant's 
commission of the subsequent act in issue: 
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       Ordinarily, when courts speak of `common plan or 
       scheme,' they are referring to a situation in which the 
       charged and the uncharged [acts] are parts of a single 
       series of events. In this context, evidence that the 
       defendant was involved in the uncharged [act] may 
       tend to show a motive for the charged [act] and hence 
       establish the commission of the . . . [act], the identity 
       of the actor, or his intention. 
 
See id. at 1268-69 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Pinney, 967 F.2d at 916) (alterations in original); 
see also 22 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, 
Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure S 5244, at 499-500 
(West 1978) ("The justification for admitting evidence of 
other crimes to prove a plan is that this involves no 
inference as to the defendant's character; instead, his 
conduct is said to be caused by his conscious commitment 
to a course of conduct of which the charged crime is only 
a part."); see, e.g., Console, 13 F.3d at 659; United States v. 
Levy, 865 F.2d 551, 558 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Another commentator has explained the conceptual basis 
for admitting Rule 404(b) evidence to prove the existence of 
a "plan" slightly differently: "In a true plan case, the courts 
hold that the prosecutor may prove any uncharged crime 
by the defendant which shows that the defendant in fact 
and in mind formed a plan including the [prior act] and the 
[ ]charged [act] as stages in the plan's execution." See 1 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence 
S 3:22, at 117 (West 1999) ("Imwinkelried I"); see also 1 
Christopher B. Mueller, Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence S 113, at 667 (2d ed. 1994) ("What is crucial in 
this setting is that the other acts . . . , considered in light 
of the circumstances, support an inference that the 
defendants . . . formed a plan or scheme that contemplated 
commission of the charged crime. . . . `[S]urrounding 
circumstances must support an inference that the crimes 
were related in the defendant's mind,' and both the other 
acts and the charged crime `must be part of a common or 
continuing scheme.' ") (quoting Imwinkelried I) (footnotes 
omitted); 22 Wright & Graham, supra S 5244, at 499-500 
("The justification for admitting evidence of other crimes to 
prove a plan is that this involves no inference as to the 
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defendant's character; instead his conduct is said to be 
caused by his conscious commitment to a course of 
conduct of which the charged crime is only a part. The 
other crime is admitted to show this larger goal  rather than 
the defendant's propensity to commit crimes.") (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added). Imwinkelried's treatise thus 
explains the concept of a "true plan" in the context of 
criminal cases: 
 
       Both crimes must be part of a common or continuing 
       scheme; the plan must encompass or include both 
       crimes; the crimes must be connected, mutually 
       dependent, and interlocking. All these variations 
       express the same core thought that both crimes must 
       be inspired by the same impulse or purpose. Both 
       crimes must be steps toward the accomplishment of 
       the same final goal. They are different stages of the 
       plan. It is not enough for the prosecution to show that 
       the defendant had a plan including crimes similar to 
       the charged crime; the prosecution must show that the 
       plan included the specific crime the defendant is now 
       charged with. 
 
Imwinkelried I, supra S 3:22, at 119 (footnotes omitted). In 
this instance, the logical relevance of the prior act to the 
fact in issue, i.e., ARCO's commission of the subsequent 
act, is that it shares with the subsequent act a similar 
purpose or motivation--a common goal. See 22 Wright & 
Graham, supra S 5244, at 500; id.  S 5244, at 483 (West 
Supp. 1999) ("To be properly admissible under Rule 404(b) 
it is not enough to show that each crime was `planned' in 
the same way; rather, there must be some overall scheme 
of which each of the crimes is but a part."). 
 
The Seaver evidence is not admissible as proof of ARCO's 
"plan" based on these principles, inasmuch as there was no 
evidence presented that the two terminations were 
connected, mutually dependent, or part of any larger goal of 
ARCO's. See Imwinkelried I, supraS 3:22, at 119; 1 Mueller 
& Kirkpatrick, supra S 113, at 667; 22 Wright & Graham, 
supra S 5244, at 483 (West Supp. 1999). The district court 
did not admit the Seaver evidence on the theory that the 
two terminations were part of ARCO's large-scale plan to 
eliminate its older employees and create a younger 
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workforce. To the contrary, the district court's comments 
clearly demonstrate that it rejected the proposition that the 
Seaver evidence could be used to suggest that conclusion to 
the jury. Moreover, it is rather obvious that the two 
terminations are unrelated in the sense that one had 
nothing to do with the other, except for the fact that, 
allegedly, ARCO facilitated both by fabricating legitimate 
reasons to support the adverse employment actions. 
Finally, the fact that the two incidents were over three 
years apart, while not conclusive, certainly undercuts the 
possibility that the two events were examples of any"plan" 
on ARCO's part. 
 
Instead, the record shows that the district court admitted 
the evidence based on the theory that it tended to show 
ARCO's "pattern," "practice" or "modus operandi" of 
fabricating legitimate reasons for terminating its employees 
when it wanted to eliminate them from its workforce. See 
App. at 3063, 3225, 3230. In J&R Ice Cream we explained 
that "a common plan or scheme may consist of incidents 
[that] were sufficiently similar to earmark them as the 
handiwork of the same actor, and thus constitute signature 
evidence of identity." See J&R Ice Cream, 31 F.3d at 1269 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Pinney, 967 F.2d at 916); see also United States v. 
Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 645-46 (3d Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979). As 
we explained in J&R Ice Cream, "[t]his method of proving 
identity through the use of [Rule 404(b) evidence] is 
sometimes labeled proof of modus operandi and 
distinguished from the use of a common plan or scheme to 
prove identity." J&R Ice Cream, 31 F.3d at 1269 n.9 
(internal quotation marks omitted).9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Wright & Graham's treatise distinguishes between evidence admitted 
on the basis that it proves the existence of a "plan" from evidence 
admitted on the theory that it shows a unique modus operandi, hence 
establishing the actor's identity. 22 Wright & Graham, supra S 5244, at 
501-02. Their treatise suggests that proof of an actor's modus operandi 
should not be admitted on the theory that the striking similarities 
between the uncharged act and the subsequent act and their unique 
features demonstrate the actor's "plan." Rather, their treatise suggests 
that Rule 404(b) evidence which can be considered proof of the actor's 
modus operandi should be admitted based on "the exception for use of 
other crimes evidence to prove identity." Id.  at 502. 
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Weinstein's treatise provides an instructive explication of 
the rationale supporting the admission of Rule 404(b) 
evidence as proof of the actor's modus operandi : 
 
        Other-crime evidence may be admitted if the evidence 
       of the other crimes is so distinctive that it can be seen 
       as a `signature' identifying a unique defendant, such as 
       the infamous Jack the Ripper. Thus, the issue in these 
       cases is whether the defendant committed the act at 
       all, unlike in intent cases, in which the issue is 
       whether the defendant had the requisite state of mind 
       when he or she committed the act. There are many 
       instances in which the details of the other crime show 
       an individuality that is highly probative of the 
       conclusion that the charged crime was committed by 
       the same person. 
 
        . . . [E]vidence of the commission of the same type of 
       crime is not sufficient on this theory unless the 
       particular method of committing the offense, the modus 
       operandi (or m.o.) is sufficiently distinctive to constitute 
       a signature. Other crimes evidence is not permissible 
       to identify a defendant as the perpetrator of the 
       charged act simply because he or she has at other 
       times committed the same garden variety criminal act, 
       since this would be identification based on the 
       forbidden inference of propensity. The question for the 
       court is whether the characteristics relied on are 
       sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit an inference of 
       pattern for purposes of proof. 
 
2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's 
Federal Evidence 2d S 404.22[5][c], at 404-117 to 404-120 
(1999). Thus, under this theory, the evidence is admitted 
for the purpose of establishing that the defendant actually 
committed the act for which he is charged, and its 
admission into the case normally arises in the criminal 
context where there is a question as to the identity of the 
perpetrator of the crime. See Pinney, 967 F.2d at 916; see 
also, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 27 F.3d 457, 461 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (admitting testimony concerning eight other 
robberies with which defendant allegedly was involved; 
court found that robberies had "many common 
characteristics which would tend to show that the 
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defendant was involved in the [instant] robbery and that 
the latter robbery was but a part of a larger common 
scheme or plan."); 2 Weinstein & Berger, supra S 404.22[4], 
at 404-102 (noting that courts "sometimes admit, in the 
name of identity, evidence of a crime that has some 
unusual features as the charged crime . . . ."). 
 
We understand the district court's admission of the 
Seaver evidence as predicated on its theory that the 
similarity between the two events--the alleged fabrication of 
performance problems to facilitate Seaver's dismissal and 
the alleged fabrication of customer complaints to support 
Becker's termination--demonstrated ARCO's modus 
operandi, which in turn could establish circumstantially a 
fact in issue--namely, whether ARCO fabricated reasons in 
order to facilitate Becker's dismissal. See Becker I, 15 F. 
Supp.2d at 614 ("[T]he lies Becker was allegedly asked to 
tell, i.e., lies about the quality of Mr. Seaver's work, were 
similar to the reasons cited by ARCO for Becker's 
termination."). Indeed, a review of the colloquy between the 
court and counsel concerning the admissibility of this 
evidence and the purpose for which it was proffered 
confirms that the district court predicated its ruling on its 
belief that the similarities between what allegedly occurred 
in Seaver's case and what allegedly transpired in 
connection with Becker's termination were sufficient to 
establish a pattern of conduct on ARCO's part which 
suggested that it fabricated reasons to justify Becker's 
dismissal. 
 
But there are two problems with admitting the Seaver 
evidence on the theory that it establishes ARCO's pattern, 
practice or modus operandi: identity was not a disputed 
issue in this case, and it cannot be argued successfully 
that the similarities between the two events show a unique 
or distinctive modus operandi. Compare J&R Ice Cream, 31 
F.3d at 1269; Pinney, 967 F.2d at 917. Indeed, with respect 
to the first issue, the parties only disputed whether ARCO 
indeed fabricated Becker's alleged performance deficiencies 
and encouraged customer complaints in order to legitimize 
an otherwise improper dismissal. In other words, the 
parties disputed whether the alleged act (the fabrication of 
problems in Becker's case) even occurred, not whether 
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ARCO, as opposed to some other person or entity, 
committed it. Compare J&R Ice Cream, 31 F.3d at 1269 
(identity of actor was not in dispute; rather, issue was 
whether the subsequent act occurred); United States v. 
LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 278 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); United 
States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(same) (overruled on other grounds, Huddleston v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496 (1988)). 
 
Despite this obvious distinction, it is clear that the 
evidential fact that Becker, the proponent of the Rule 404(b) 
evidence, sought to prove was the same--that ARCO indeed 
committed a particular act that is disputed in this case. 
Moreover, as in the case where the government introduces 
Rule 404(b) evidence to establish the actor's identity by 
modus operandi, Becker contended that the similarities 
between the prior and subsequent acts provided a sufficient 
foundational basis to establish the actor's "plan," and 
hence the commission of the subsequent act itself. See 2 
Weinstein & Berger, supra S 404.22[5][c], at 404-119 to 120 
("The question for the court [in admitting prior acts on the 
theory that they are so distinctive to as to identify the 
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime] is whether the 
characteristics relied on are sufficiently idiosyncratic to 
permit an inference of pattern for purposes of proof."); see 
also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual 
Construction to Resolve the Dispute over the Meaning of the 
Term "Plan" in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) , 43 U. Kan. 
L. Rev. 1005, 1007-08 (1995) ("Imwinkelried II") ("The 
prosecutor would point to as many similarities as possible 
between the charged crime and the . . . uncharged offenses. 
Indeed, there is a good deal of authority that standing 
alone, proof of an accused's commission of recent, similar 
crimes is sufficient foundational proof of the existence of a 
`plan.' "). 
 
In this sense, then, Becker pointed to the Seaver evidence 
and argued that ARCO had developed a distinct strategy 
that it followed in terminating its unwanted employees 
which made it more likely that it adhered to its plan in 
terminating Becker. Compare Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage 
Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1998) (where parties 
disputed authenticity of employer's memorandum 
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indicating that plaintiff was terminated for discriminatory 
reasons, court of appeals upheld admission of evidence 
showing that in prior litigation with his employer, plaintiff 
produced a contract that the employer denied ever signing; 
court determined that evidence established that plaintiff 
had "a common scheme or plan in disputes with his former 
employers-creating false documents in anticipation of 
litigation"); United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 276 (8th 
Cir. 1996) ("[The witness] testified to a remarkably similar 
series of prior actions by [the defendant]: a motorist is 
stopped for speeding, a firearm is discovered, and the 
motorist is given the choice of facing charges or`working it 
out' with [the defendant]."). 
 
Thus, as we see it, the dispositive question in this case 
is whether Rule 404(b) permitted Becker to introduce 
evidence of one alleged similar instance of prior conduct by 
ARCO's supervisory employee to establish ARCO's"plan" 
(otherwise described as its pattern, practice or"common 
design") and hence the commission of a similar subsequent 
act by a different ARCO employee, where the identity of the 
actor is not an issue and the similarities between the two 
events are not sufficient to show a distinct modus operandi.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Certain commentators suggest that courts often (and improperly) 
conflate the two theoretical underpinnings for admissibility of Rule 
404(b) evidence under the label of a "common scheme or plan." For 
example, courts have admitted Rule 404(b) evidence to establish the 
defendant's purported pattern of conduct that suggests the defendant 
committed the subsequent act, even where the issue is not identity of 
the perpetrator, and/or the prior events are not sufficiently distinct to 
qualify as evidence of "modus operandi." Imwinkelried's treatise thus 
explains: 
 
        Some courts are quite liberal in admitting uncharged misconduct 
       under the rubric of `plan.' If the proponent can show a series of 
       similar acts, these courts admit the evidence on the theory that a 
       pattern or systematic course of conduct is sufficient to establish 
a 
 
       plan [which in turn establishes the commission of the act]. 
       Similarity or likeness between the crimes suffices. In effect, 
these 
 
       courts convert the doctrine into a plan-to-commit-a-series-of- 
       similar-crimes theory. 
 
        . . . . 
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Compare Jankins v. TDC Management Corp., 21 F.3d 436, 
440-41 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reversing jury finding in favor of 
plaintiff who introduced Rule 404(b) evidence of defendant's 
alleged failure to pay subcontractors on the theory that it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        In these cases, the similarity between the crimes is ordinarily 
       inadequate to satisfy the modus operandi doctrine. . . . 
 
        In reality, these courts are arguably permitting the proponent to 
       introduce propensity evidence in violation of the prohibition in 
the 
 
       first sentence of Rule 404(b). Proof of a number of similar 
burglaries 
       . . . may be probative of the defendant's status as a professional 
       criminal; and the similarities may tend to show that when faced 
       with similar, random opportunities for committing a crime, the 
       defendant repeatedly chooses to use roughly the same methodology. 
       However, if the similarities are insufficient to establish modus 
and 
 
       there is no inference of a true plan in the defendant's mind, the 
       proponent is offering the evidence on a forbidden theory of logical 
       relevance. 
 
Imwinkelried I, supra S 3:24, at 128-29 (footnotes omitted); see also 1 
Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra S 113, at 667 (explaining the admission of 
Rule 404(b) evidence on the theory that it establishes the defendant's 
plan or scheme, and hence the defendant's commission of the 
subsequent act, and noting "[i]t is not enough that other crimes 
resemble the charged crime. If they are not sufficiently similar to the 
charged offense or not distinctive enough to be admitted to show modus 
operandi (hence identity), admitting other crimes to show plan or scheme 
merely because they bear some resemblance to the charged offense 
cannot be defended."); see also 22 Wright & Graham, supra S 5244, at 
482-83 (West Supp. 1999) (where court admitted evidence in statutory 
rape case showing that in two previous instances, the defendant 
similarly enticed victims (who all were runaways) into exchanging sex for 
food and shelter, commentators suggested that court erred because prior 
similar instances were "evidence of propensity, not plan"; "To say that 
the defendant had a `plan' to seduce every runaway he could may not do 
violence to the language but it does undermine the policy of Rule 404(b) 
by permitting the use of propensity to prove conduct."). But see II 
Wigmore, supra S 304, at 249 ("When the very doing of the act charged 
is still to be proved, one of the evidential facts receivable is the 
person's 
design or plan to do it. . . . The added element[in these circumstances], 
must be, not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence 
of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as 
caused by a general plan of which they are the individual 
manifestations."). 
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demonstrated a common scheme or plan by which the 
defendant systematically committed fraud; court found that 
the prior instances were dissimilar and temporally remote 
from plaintiff 's and defendant's dispute and could not be 
admitted on that theory, or to show the defendant's intent) 
(citing, inter alia, I Wigmore, Evidence  S 304, at 202-03 (3d 
ed. 1940)). 
 
Contrary to the district court's legal conclusion on this 
point, see Becker I, 15 F. Supp.2d at 614, we hold that 
standing alone, the similarities between the Seaver evidence 
and the allegations of fact in this case do not provide a 
sufficient foundation from which the existence of ARCO's 
"scheme or plan" of fabricating reasons in terminating its 
employees may be inferred so as to justify admitting the 
Seaver evidence on that basis. We cannot agree that the 
"plan" exception listed in Rule 404(b) supports the 
admission of the Seaver evidence to show that ARCO 
engaged in a similar impropriety in Becker's case simply by 
virtue of the "similarity" between the two alleged events. 
Consequently, we find, notwithstanding contrary 
protestations, that the district court admitted the evidence 
for "exactly the purpose that Rule 404(b) declared to be 
improper, . . . namely, to establish the defendants' 
propensity to commit the charged act." See J&R Ice Cream, 
31 F.3d at 1269 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also Herman, 589 F.2d at 1198 (finding that 
district court erred in admitting testimony that defendant 
engaged in similar extortion scheme which was unrelated to 
extortion scheme with which he was charged; court found 
that testimony did not demonstrate that the similarities 
were so distinctive so as to justify an inference that the 
defendant participated in both transactions, and modus 
operandi "was at best a collateral issue in the case"; "What 
was centrally in issue was whether [the defendant] was the 
kind of person who would take a bribe.") (citing Rules 
404(b) and 403); State v. G.V., 744 A.2d 137, 142 (N.J. 
2000) (per curiam) (in prosecution of father for, inter alia, 
sexual assault against his daughter, court found that the 
trial court erred in admitting evidence of father's prior 
sexual molestation of his other daughter at the same time 
of the day (evening) and at about the same age as the 
victim; prosecutor's summation alluded to the fact that 
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evidence demonstrated a "[s]imilar fact pattern," and 
showed "the way he operate[d]," and court observed "If that 
is not an allusion to propensity, then we do not know what 
would be."). 
 
We find support for our conclusion in this regard in our 
opinion in J&R Ice Cream, 31 F.3d at 1268-69, where we 
addressed the evidentiary use of similar uncharged acts of 
misconduct to demonstrate a scheme or plan under Rule 
404(b). There the plaintiff, J&R Ice Cream Corp., a former 
franchisee, sued the defendants/franchisors, collectively 
referred to as defendant "California Smoothie," under the 
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("the Act"). 11 After 
terminating its franchise rights, J&R Ice Cream sued 
California Smoothie because it sustained losses in 
connection with a California Smoothie store it opened in a 
mall in Florida. J&R Ice Cream obtained a jury verdict in its 
favor, based on its theory that California Smoothie violated 
the Act by making certain representations to it during 
franchise negotiations. Specifically, the jury found that 
California Smoothie violated the Act by, inter alia, (1) 
misrepresenting the amount of J&R Ice Cream's potential 
gross sales in its first operation of a California Smoothie 
franchise, and (2) misrepresenting California Smoothie's 
expertise in selecting profitable locations for franchises, and 
in choosing the Florida site for J&R Ice Cream's store. See 
id. at 1265. 
 
On appeal, California Smoothie challenged the district 
court's admission of the testimony of two unrelated former 
California Smoothie franchisees as to misrepresentations 
California Smoothie allegedly made to them. Specifically, 
the district court permitted J&R Ice Cream to introduce 
testimony that California Smoothie made similar 
representations to the other two franchisees regarding the 
sales and profits a California Smoothie franchise would 
produce. See id. at 1268. While the district court originally 
admitted the testimony to establish California Smoothie's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The plaintiff also asserted a common law negligence claim based on 
the defendant's alleged negligence in selecting a poor site for plaintiff 
's 
franchise and its negligence in negotiating the lease there. See J&R Ice 
Cream, 31 F.3d at 1264. 
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"intent" and "common scheme or plan," it later determined 
that the testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b) as 
evidence of California Smoothie's "plan," i.e., "common 
scheme or business practice of representing sales and profit 
figures to potential franchisees." See id. 
 
We held that the district court erred in admitting this 
testimony under its theory that it tended to establish 
California Smoothie's scheme, plan or pattern of 
representing sales and profit figures in order to induce 
potential franchisees to acquire a California Smoothie 
franchise. We began our analysis of the issue of the 
admissibility of this testimony under Rule 404(b) with the 
statement that, contrary to the district court's 
determination, the "testimony was not admissible as 
evidence of a common scheme or plan." See id.  In support 
of that conclusion, we outlined the basic theories for 
admitting Rule 404(b) evidence under the rationale that 
such evidence demonstrates the defendant's common 
scheme or plan. See id. at 1269. After explaining that the 
evidence was not relevant to an ultimate issue in the case 
such as motive, identity or intent because those issues 
were undisputed, we concluded that the "evidence was 
admitted for exactly the purpose Rule 404(b) declared to be 
improper, . . . namely to establish the defendant's 
propensity to commit the charged act." Id.  (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted). 
 
After reviewing the possible theories offered in support of 
the district court's ruling, we ultimately held that the 
court's admission of this evidence was reversible error. 
Importantly, in reaching our conclusion, we found the 
district court's comments particularly relevant because the 
court had acknowledged that it admitted the prior 
testimony for an improper purpose when it stated that " `[i]n 
the context of this case, I believe that it was proper to show 
that it was more likely that representations of sales figures 
were made to . . . [J&R Ice Cream] by demonstrating that 
the officials of California Smoothie had a practice of making 
such representations.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
from district court record). Thus, J&R Ice Cream  rejected 
the district court's conclusion that the testimony was 
admissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence of California 
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Smoothie's "business practice," i.e., its pattern, scheme or 
plan of representing sales and profit figures to potential 
franchisees, for the specific purpose of showing that 
California Smoothie made the same sort of representations 
to the plaintiff. 
 
Just as in J&R Ice Cream, the district court admitted the 
Seaver evidence to establish a contested material fact based 
only on the similarity of the prior event to a subsequent, 
unrelated occurrence which was alleged to have happened 
in Becker's case. Here, the district court admitted the 
Seaver evidence on the theory that it was more likely that 
ARCO fabricated its purported nondiscriminatory reasons 
for terminating Becker if ARCO's management had a 
pattern or practice of inventing performance problems in 
order to facilitate the termination of other employees. See 
app. at 3225-28 ("It's not being offered to say that Mr. 
Victor is a bad person because he had-he had done this in 
the past. It's being offered to show a pattern, or habit. . . . 
I mean it seems to me that in this case the event is nearly 
identical and as such it would be probative of plan . . . I 
would agree with you if it had to do with some other 
conduct that is not probative, but we have allegedly the 
same case. . . ."). Moreover, as in J&R Ice Cream, the 
district court admitted the Seaver evidence because, in its 
view, the evidence mirrored Becker's version of the events 
leading up to his discharge, thus tending to corroborate 
Becker's theory of his case. Compare J&R Ice Cream, 31 
F.3d at 1269 (holding that district court abused its 
discretion in admitting evidence on the theory that it 
showed that "it was more likely" that the defendant made 
similar representations to the plaintiffs, where 
representations formed in part the factual basis for the 
jury's finding on the consumer fraud count against 
defendant). 
 
We believe that the district court's rationale for admitting 
the Seaver evidence mirrors in all material respects the 
district court's reasoning that we expressly rejected in J&R 
Ice Cream. Compare app. at 3230 ("The point is that 
[Becker's] testimony is [allegedly] exactly what is happening 
in this case, I was asked to do it before, that goes to motive, 
intent and practice.") (emphasis added); app. at 3225 ("It's 
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being offered to show a pattern, or habit.") with J&R Ice 
Cream, 31 F.3d at 1269 ("I believe that it was proper to 
show that it was more likely that representation of sales 
figures were made to [plaintiff] by demonstrating that 
[defendant] had a practice of making such representations.") 
(emphasis added). Thus, our opinion in J&R Ice Cream 
leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the district 
court erred in admitting the Seaver evidence on the theory 
that it established ARCO's common scheme, plan or pattern 
of action. It is obvious in view of J&R Ice Cream that Becker 
introduced the Seaver evidence for an improper purpose-- 
solely to establish ARCO's propensity to fabricate reasons 
to justify terminating its employees so that the jury would 
conclude that ARCO did the same thing when it dismissed 
Becker. We believe that the not so hidden message behind 
Becker's testimony regarding the Seaver incident essentially 
was that because ARCO did it once, it was likely that it did 
it again. But as we previously have admonished,"[t]his type 
of inference is precisely the kind prohibited by Rule 404(b)." 
Pinney, 967 F.2d at 917. 
 
Becker contends that our opinion in J&R Ice Cream is 
factually distinguishable and therefore does not compel the 
conclusion that the district court erred in admitting the 
Seaver evidence. He argues specifically that we predicated 
our analysis in J&R Ice Cream on our finding that 
California Smoothie's business practice of representing 
potential profits was not admissible to prove California 
Smoothie's intent because intent was not an essential 
element to a claim under the Act. See J&R Ice Cream, 31 
F.3d at 1268. 
 
We need not tarry on this argument, however, as it does 
not address that aspect of our opinion in J&R Ice Cream 
which is dispositive here. It is true that in J&R Ice Cream 
we ruled that evidence of California Smoothie's"business 
practice" was not admissible to establish its intent because 
intent was not an essential element of the claim at issue. 
But we further determined that the district court should 
not have admitted the testimony of the other franchisees on 
the theory that it established California Smoothie's 
business "plan" because it did not satisfy the criteria for 
admitting evidence under that exception in Rule 404(b). It 
 
                                46 
 
 
is the latter aspect of the reasoning in J&R Ice Cream which 
we find determinative. Indeed, parallel with our conclusion 
with respect to the disputed evidence in J&R Ice Cream, we 
have determined that the Seaver evidence was not 
admissible for the express purpose of proving ARCO's 
intent to discriminate against Becker, and our finding in 
that regard thus has required us to consider whether it 
could be admitted under the "plan" exception listed in Rule 
404(b). And to the extent that the plaintiff in J&R Ice Cream 
sought to establish the same type of contested evidential 
fact through the admission of a similar form of"business 
practice" evidence, our analysis there clearly compels our 
conclusion that the Seaver evidence is not admissible as 
proof of ARCO's common scheme, plan, pattern or modus 
operandi of fabricating performance problems in 
terminating its employees. 
 
We also point out that the district court stated that it 
believed that the evidence was admissible under the theory 
that it tended to show ARCO's "habit" when confronted with 
the task of having to terminate its employees. App. at 3225- 
26. It thus appears that the district court confused the 
concepts of "modus operandi" and "habit or practice," the 
latter of which is addressed in Rule 406, which provides: 
 
       Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine 
       practice of an organization, whether corroborated or 
       not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is 
       relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or 
       organization on a particular occasion was in conformity 
       with the habit or routine practice. 
 
The Advisory Committee Notes provide an instructive 
explanation of the theoretical basis for this rule: 
         Character and habit are close akin. Character is a 
       generalized description of one's disposition, or of one's 
       disposition in respect to a general trait, such as 
       honesty, temperance, or peacefulness. Habit, in 
       modern usage, both lay and psychological, is more 
       specific. It describes one's regular response to a 
       repeated specific situation. . . . A habit [ ] . . . [ ] is the 
       person's regular practice of meeting a particular kind 
       of situation with a specific type of conduct, such as the 
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       habit of going down a particular stairway two stairs at 
       a time, or of giving the hand-signal for a left turn, or of 
       alighting from railway cars while they are moving. The 
       doing of the habitual acts may become semi-automatic. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 406 advisory committee's note (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also 1 McCormick, supra 
S 195, at 826 ("By and large, the detailed patterns of 
situation-specific behavior that constitute habits are 
unlikely to provoke such sympathy or antipathy as would 
disturb the process of evaluating the evidence."). 
 
Clearly, Rule 406 does not support the introduction of 
the Seaver evidence on the basis that it was ARCO's"habit" 
to fabricate reasons for terminating its employees. The 
Seaver evidence did not show ARCO's "regular response to 
a specific situation," as the nature of the alleged conduct-- 
the fabrication of reasons to justify its employees' 
dismissals--is not the sort of semi-automatic, situation- 
specific conduct admitted under the rule. Moreover, the 
Seaver evidence ostensibly showed only, at best, one other 
instance in which ARCO exhibited its alleged repetitive 
behavior. 
 
Finally, Becker contends that even if the court erred in 
admitting the evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), the 
evidence was admissible under Rule 608(b). Appellee 
Becker's Br. at 37-38 & n.10. Nevertheless, as ARCO 
correctly points out, Rule 608(b) does not provide a basis 
for admitting this testimony, inasmuch as the plain 
language of the first sentence of the Rule prohibits the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances 
of a witness's conduct for the purpose of attacking the 
witness's credibility.12 See United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Rule 608(b) provides (emphasis added): 
 
       (b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific in stances of the 
conduct 
       of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the 
witness' 
       credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 
609, 
 
       may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the 
       discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or 
       untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the 
       witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or 
       untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or 
       untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness 
       being cross-examined has testified. 
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231, 257 (3d Cir.) (discussing distinction between Rules 
404(b) and 608(b) and finding that "Rule 608(b) applies 
because the government did not introduce extrinsic 
evidence about these other acts [by the testifying witness]; 
all it did was ask [the witness] about them"), as amended, 
197 F.3d 662, 663 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1999). The Seaver 
evidence clearly qualifies as extrinsic evidence, whether we 
assume that Becker introduced it to contradict Victor's 
testimony concerning the events which allegedly transpired 
at the meeting in August 1990, or alternatively, to impeach 
ARCO's suggestion through its witnesses that it retained its 
older workers. In either event, Rule 608(b) does not support 
the admission of the testimony, and we cannot uphold the 
district court's ruling on that alternative basis. 
 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, we have 
considered each of the various rationales the district court 
proffered in connection with its ruling on the Seaver 
evidence, but have determined that none supports the 
admission of Becker's testimony on this point. We hold, 
therefore, that the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting the Seaver evidence. In view of our finding in this 
regard, we need not consider whether the evidence was 
admissible under the balancing analysis contemplated by 
Rule 403. 
 
Despite the district court's error in admitting the 
evidence under Rule 404(b), we would not be required to 
reverse and remand for a new trial if we could find that the 
court's admission of Seaver evidence was harmless. As we 
have indicated, a finding of reversible error"may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected." See 
Glass, 34 F.3d at 191 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"In reviewing evidentiary rulings, if the Courtfinds 
nonconstitutional error in a civil suit, such error is 
harmless only if it is highly probable that the error did not 
affect the outcome of the case." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 924-25 
(stating that standard we adopted in Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976), 
governs harmless error determination in civil and criminal 
cases). 
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At oral argument, Becker's counsel contended that if the 
district court's evidentiary ruling was incorrect, the error 
was harmless. Becker also pointed out that the court 
provided a jury instruction, which we have reproduced in 
its entirety above, that outlined the purposes for which the 
Seaver evidence could be considered. 
 
In response, ARCO countered that its admission was far 
from harmless, inasmuch as this evidence was particularly 
powerful and damaging to ARCO given its defense strategy. 
It also pointed out that Becker's position before us--that 
the testimony was insignificant in light of the other 
evidence in the record--clearly was undermined by the fact 
that Becker's attorneys repeatedly sought its admission 
during the course of the trial. 
 
We have reviewed the entire record in this case, and we 
conclude that ARCO has the better argument here. First, 
we note that the jury instruction the district court provided 
concerning the proper uses of the Rule 404(b) evidence 
does little to convince us that the district court's error was 
harmless in the circumstances. In Sampson, we found that 
the district court's jury instruction concerning the proper 
uses of Rule 404(b) evidence provided inadequate guidance 
to the jury on that point because it "simply repeat[ed] the 
entire litany of permissible theories under Rule 404(b)," and 
failed to limit the government to the theories it proffered in 
support of admission of the evidence. 980 F.2d at 889. 
Here, the district court's instruction is just as troublesome 
as the one we addressed in Sampson, inasmuch as it 
suffers from identical deficiencies. In our view, these 
problems in the jury instruction certainly increase the 
likelihood that the jury utilized this evidence for an 
improper purpose-namely, to find ARCO liable based on an 
impermissible inference concerning ARCO's "character" and 
its propensity to fabricate or "trump up" problems with its 
employees. Thus, the jury instruction the district court 
provided here hardly supports Becker's harmless error 
argument. See also State v. Fortin, No. 1-95/96 Sept. Term 
1998, 2000 WL 202643, at *9 (N.J. Feb. 23, 2000) (when 
Rule 404(b) evidence is admitted the trial court should give 
a specific charge with reference to the factual content of the 
case so that the jury may understand the purposes for 
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which the evidence may be considered); G.V., 744 A.2d at 
144 (rejecting harmless error argument and observing that 
"even if the evidence had been admissible on the subsidiary 
issues in the case, the charge in this case left the jury 
wholly unguided as to how to use the evidence for such 
limited purposes"). 
 
Moreover, quite apart from the lack of real guidance in 
the jury instruction, given its nature, we do not believe that 
it can be argued successfully that the district court's error 
in admitting the Seaver evidence was harmless. Just as we 
found in J&R Ice Cream with respect to the Rule 404(b) 
evidence there, the Seaver evidence clearly was prejudicial 
because it portrayed ARCO as an organization engaged in a 
scheme to get rid of its unwanted employees by lying to 
them and falsifying complaints and other performance 
problems to facilitate the disfavored employees' dismissals. 
Also, the evidence was particularly damaging given the 
theory of Becker's case--that his alleged performance 
problems were fabricated and that the customer complaints 
were "inaccurate" and "misleading." Furthermore, ARCO's 
seemingly cruel way of dismissing Becker, a long-time 
employee, could not have endeared it to the jury, thus 
making the Seaver evidence all the more damaging. Indeed, 
the district court noted the significance of the Seaver 
evidence and its value to the plaintiff 's case, app. at 3229 
("I don't think there will be any stronger evidence"), and 
Becker's counsel spent a significant time in her closing 
argument explaining her theory as to how this evidence 
proved Becker's case against ARCO.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Seizing on this evidence, admitted on the last day of trial, plaintiff 
's 
counsel made the following comments in her closing: 
 
        Now, we've also relied on other evidence, not just the 
       inconsistencies and contradictions. That's one part of it. If their 
       position is inconsistent or contradictory, you canfind that's 
pretext. 
       Well, what's the evidence of pretext? We can rely on comments from 
       individuals as well. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        Now, in 1990 Dr. Ramey asked Mr. Becker to agree with him that 
       another individual's work, [Linwood] Seaver, was bad. Mr. Becker 
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Given these circumstances, we cannot say with 
confidence that it is "highly probable that the error did not 
substantially affect" ARCO's rights. J&R Ice Cream, 31 F.3d 
at 1269 (citing Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500 (3d 
Cir. 1993)). To the contrary, the most we can say after 
reviewing the record is that even without the Seaver 
evidence, it would have been sufficient to support a verdict 
in Becker's favor and that he would have had a reasonable 
chance of obtaining that verdict.14 Accordingly, we are left 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       didn't do that. He didn't agree to lie. He wouldn't. And Mr. Victor 
       was present during that meeting. Mr. Victor was there, and his 
       presence there has some meaning. He was a participant by his 
       silence, by his being there. Just like if you said, I'm going to 
kill so 
       and so and there's two people involved and one of them doesn't say 
       anything. Well, Mr. Victor was there and Mr. Becker refused to lie 
       for Dr. Ramey. 
 
        And you heard his testimony. I'm going to fire him anyway, he's 
       terminated. It doesn't matter if he did good work, just like it 
doesn't 
       matter if Mr. Becker did good work. The same type of plan, the same 
       type of operation. Mr. Victor couldn't recall, couldn't remember. I 
       don't know, I don't recall, I don't remember. How many times did he 
       say that? Very selective memory. That's very important. 
 
        Mr. Becker refused to go along with it. And you know what, Mr. 
       Victor said, Mr. Becker doesn't lie. You heard him say that. He 
never 
       lied to him. He's known to him to be a truthful person. 
 
App. at 3268-69. Later in the closing, Becker's counsel stated: 
 
       In addition, the comment about asking Mr. Becker to lie about Mr. 
       Seaver's work so they could fire him in a similar manner. This, 
       together with the prima facie case we submit, please, shows that 
age 
 
       played a role in Mr. Becker's firing, and of course, his rejection 
of 
       that early retirement offer where he was targeted. 
 
App. at 3279. 
 
14. As we have indicated in note 3, supra, ARCO does not argue in this 
appeal that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 
50 based on the sufficiency of Becker's evidence of age discrimination. 
We also point out here that ARCO does not contend that we should 
instruct the district court to enter a judgment in its favor based on the 
insufficiency of the remaining, properly admitted evidence concerning 
ARCO's liability for age discrimination. See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 
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with no alternative but to reverse the district court's denial 
of ARCO's post-trial motion insofar as it requested a new 
trial on all issues, and remand the matter to the district 
court with directions to grant a new trial on the federal and 
state age discrimination claims. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude with the following observation. The 
proceedings in this matter and in Morley as well as other 
cases we have cited demonstrate that great care must be 
taken when a party offers Rule 404(b) evidence. The rule is 
not easy to apply and its misapplication may lead to a 
significant waste of the parties' and the court's time. 
Indeed, in this case the result might have been the same 
without the Seaver evidence. The important point is that a 
party cannot justify admission of Rule 404(b) evidence 
merely by reciting in conclusory terms that the evidence is 
admissible under that rule. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we are constrained to hold 
that the district court erred in admitting the Seaver 
evidence, and that we cannot say that ARCO's substantial 
rights were not affected. Accordingly, we will reverse the 
district court's order of June 30, 1998, insofar as it denied 
ARCO's motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a), and will 
remand the matter to the district court with directions to 
grant a new trial on all issues pertaining to the age 
discrimination claims. Moreover, inasmuch as we have 
determined that a new trial in its entirety is warranted, we 
dismiss Becker's cross-appeal as moot. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
S.Ct. 1011, 1022 (2000) ("We . . . hold that the authority of courts of 
appeals to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law extends to 
cases in which, on excision of testimony erroneously admitted, there 
remains insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict."). In any 
event, our review of the record and the remaining evidence presented at 
trial confirms that ARCO is not entitled to a judgment in its favor at 
this 
 
juncture. 
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